General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell

The right man in the wrong place?

General Joseph Warren Stilwell (1883-1946) of the U.S. Army has a complicated and divisive legacy. Some consider him one of the most brilliant American commanders, who almost led the country’s first and last offensives in the war, but who was robbed of opportunity and glory by the scheming of others. Other people revile him as a terrible leader who failed to understand the needs of his superiors, equals and subordinates. We will try to paint a balanced picture of “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, and let you make up your own mind.
 
Stilwell was born into a strict and religious family, but ended up rebelling and becoming a troublesome youth in school. He attended West Point at his father’s insistence: he endured hazing he later described as “hell,” introduced basketball to the academy, and had two demerits for laughing during drill. Nevertheless, he showed great promise. As a second lieutenant, he carried an exhausted comrade to safety across a hostile jungle in the Philippines. He served under both American and French command during World War I, performing reconnaissance in no man’s land on several occasions. Having shown a talent at learning languages, he had spent over a decade in China between the two World Wars, serving as a construction engineer, a battalion commander and a military attaché and mastering spoken and written Chinese. He grew to love the country and its people, and understood Chinese politics well, but considered China’s leaders lacking.

Stilwell developed a reputation as an energetic, hard-driving, no-nonsense commander who disdained military pomp and ceremony, and offered blunt criticism. One of his subordinates, hurt by Stilwell’s remarks during an exercise, once drew a caricature of him rising out of a bottle of vinegar. Stilwell wasn’t offended by the drawing; in fact, he leaned into the image, sending photographs of it to friends.
 
Stilwell was considered one of the Army’s top corps commanders based on his performance at large-scale exercises shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, had served with Stilwell in China, and considered him “farsighted, highly intelligent,” and “one of the exceptionally brilliant and cultured men of the Army.” In December 1941, Stilwell was picked to develop plans for America’s first offensive in World War II. President Roosevelt felt that the country needed a quick victory to prop up confidence and war support after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and to show allied nations its capabilities. Stilwell was to plan and lead an amphibious attack on the Vichy French port of Dakar in West Africa.

Taking Dakar was not going to be easy; in fact, a joint British and Free French force had already tried and failed to do so in 1940. Additionally, the U.S. war industry was just starting to gear up, and transportation capacity was very limited. Both Stilwell and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the original war planners had underestimated the danger of enemy submarines, as well as the probability of Spain joining the war on the Axis side. Perhaps even worse, the initial landing would have had to be made with 11,000 Marines, who would have then had to fight without reinforcements for 45 days, the time it took the transport fleet to return to America, pick up three more divisions, and steam for Africa again. Additionally, top brass started dithering. Two days into the planning, Stilwell was told that the landing would take place at Casablanca instead, in a completely different part of Africa. The very next day, he was told it was going to be one or the other. For Stilwell, it ended up being neither.
 
Japanese forces were on the offensive in the Pacific, taking Singapore and British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and forcing General Douglas MacArthur to abandon the Philippines (Read our earlier article) China had already been fighting Japan since 1937, and helping them seemed to be the key to stop Japanese expansion. Stilwell, speaking Chinese and knowing the country well, was taken off the planning of African landings and sent to Asia instead. He wasn’t keen on going, but Marshall told him “Joe, you have 24 hours to think up a better candidate. Otherwise it’s you.” Stilwell knew that nobody was more familiar with the region than him.

The British primarily wanted to defend Burma against the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to concentrate on China. Additionally, the Generalissimo was propped up by a fragile web of military and diplomatic alliances, and Stilwell’s efforts to reform the Chinese army and curb in rampant corruption stepped on the toes of many of Chiang’s supporters. Stilwell was promised command over all Chinese forces, but Chinese commanders tended to consider his orders mere “advice” and took their actual orders from Chiang. Stilwell’s idea to train several Chinese divisions in India was opposed by the British, who feared that the presence of well-trained and equipped Chinese soldiers might fan pro-independence sentiments among the Indian population. In contrast, Chiang felt that Chinese forces defending Burma were just helping the British hang on to their imperial holdings. Stilwell also had to contend with a fellow American: Major General Claire Lee Chennault, commander of the First American Volunteer Group, the famous Flying Tigers (later China Air Task Force and 14th Air Force), who had his own ideas on how to fight the Japanese, and had Chiang’s ear more often than Stilwell did.

It quickly became clear that Burma could not be held. In the spring of 1942, with Allied defenses collapsing, Stilwell refused to be airlifted to safety. Instead, he led his 117-man staff on a 140-mile (225 km) foot march to India, maintaining the “Stilwell stride” of 105 paces per minute. His retreat left behind 100,000 Chinese soldiers, a quarter of whom perished in the war later.

The loss of Burma also meant the loss of land routes through which the Allies could supply Chinese forces from India. The last remaining supply line was “the Hump,” a perilous air route over the Himalaya mountains, which could not keep both Stilwell Chinese forces and the Flying Tigers supplied. Stilwell considered it a priority to liberate Burma, or at least its northern part, and reestablish land routes, but did not have the means to do so. 

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